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I. INTRODUCTION
In November, 1983, the Reagan Administration publicly announced
new regulations for the transfer of technology to the People's Republic of
China ("China").' The new regulations are designed "to reflect a more
liberal export control policy" by raising dramatically the volume and so-
phistication of technologically advanced goods developed in the United
States available for licensing and export to China.2 To facilitate the pol-
icy the Administration transferred China to the country group under the
Export Administration Regulations3 which includes the NATO coun-
tries and other friendly non-aligned nations. The immediate effect of this
recategorization appears to be that the export of most goods and technol-
ogy to China will be routinely approved rather than subject to the old
policy of case-by-case review.4 This Comment argues, however, that
while the new export regulations will encourage an increase flow of ad-
vanced technology to China, the new policy may be undermined by other
significant, and potentially unresolvable trade issues between the two
countries.5
The new export control policy marks an evolutionary change in
United States regulation of technology transfer to China.6 Reflecting sig-
nificantly improved United States-China relations, the new licensing
guidelines were established primarily as a means (1) to facilitate China's
technological and economic modernization and integration into the
world economic system, and (2) to realize the economic benefits to be
obtained by United States businesses from expanded trade with China.
7
1 Amendments to Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 368, 370-76, 379, 385-86,
399 (1984).
2 See infra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
3 Amendments to Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(c). See infra notes
94-100 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 101-15 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 149-82 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
7 Hearings Before the Subcommitte on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House
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The previous policy proved inadequate because the licensing process was
both inefficient and inconsistent, and the regulations were unclear and
unworkable.8 The new guidelines are expected to expedite the licensing
process by eliminating the case-by-case review of licensing applications,
and to operate more effectively according to well-defined rules. The most
noticeable change in policy, however, is the governmental permission ex-
tended to United States firms to export to China substantially higher
volumes of "dual use" technology-technology exported for civilian pur-
poses but with potential for military application. 9
Although the new regulations are applauded enthusiastically by nu-
merous American business and political groups, they are not free from
criticism. Historically, the United States export control policy has been
one of the most significant and controversial issues directly affecting both
economic and political relations between two countries.1" In formulating
the new China export control policy, the Administration acknowledged
and tried to balance two competing interests: liberalization of export
controls through increased transfer of technology to promote better
United States-China trade relations, and the need for limitations on gov-
ernment licensing of advanced "dual use" technology in order to pre-
serve United States national security. 1 On the one hand, it is desirable
to export sophisticated technology to aid in China's modernization effort,
and to promote United States investment, by making it easier for busi-
nesses to capitalize on China's rapidly expanding market for advanced
technology. On the other hand, there is concern that technology trans-
ferred to China now may be used against the United States by China or
some other country in the future. 12 Success of the new guidelines in pro-
moting United States-China relations and investment by United States
firms in Chinese ventures will depend, in part, upon whether the Reagan
Administration reached a proper balance between these two goals, as
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1983) (testimony of William T. Archey, Acting
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration) [hereinafter cited as Hearings-testimony
of W. Archey]. For the initial articulation of President Reagan's policy rationale, see U.S. Technol-
ogy Transfer to China: Hearing Before the Special Subcommittee on US. Trade with China of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-19 (1983) (testimony of Mal-
cohn Baldrigde, Secretary of Commerce).
8 See infra notes 127-41 and accompanying text.
9 Many kinds of "dual use" or "gray area" technology has military application, even if that
technology is purchased initially for civilian economic projects. For a good discussion of the benefits
and burdens of transferring "dual use" technology to China, see A.D. BARNET, CHINA'S ECON-
OMy IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 549-61 (1981).





well as the government's success in providing a workable licensing
process.
This Comment will focus on the nature and likely effect of the new
United States export licensing rules regulating the transfer of technology
to China. Part I will address the history and development of United
States export control policy to China. Part II will discuss both the ideo-
logical debate over the appropriate China technology transfer policy, and
the general licensing procedures under the United States Export Admin-
istration Act. Part III will analyze the substantial changes in and practi-
cal effect of the new licensing guidelines for China, and the policy reasons
behind the changes. Part IV will assess the probable impact of the new
export policy on United States-China trade relations and the potential
problems United States exporters are likely to face in foreign trade with
China. As of January, 1984, United States exporters were very optimis-
tic about current predictions that trade between the United States and
China will reach record figures in 1984.13 A gradual trend toward liber-
alization of technology transfer controls to Communist China reflects the
friendly attitude the countries are presently exhibiting toward one an-
other, and each country's recognition that better relations are mutually
beneficial. However, as United States-Soviet relations demonstrate,
friendly relations can quickly turn hostile, thereby upsetting trade rela-
tions carefully negotiated over many years.
14
Therefore, United States exporters should keep in mind that Sino-
United States economic relations will be inextricably linked to the polit-
ical climate and the economic conditions in each country. 15 While the
benefits of increased trade between China and the United States are po-
tentially great for both countries, so too are the potential harms if either
country's expectations for a prosperous and smooth trading relationship
are disappointed.16 Moreover, the viability of the new laws regulating
technology transfer to China will depend greatly on the cooperation of
not only United States and Chinese officials, but also from the United
States European allies directly involved in the transfer of technologically
13 Farnsworth, China Cautiously Increasing Its Worldwide Investments, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1984, at Al, col. 1.
14 See US. to Ease Technology Controls, Change Country Group; August Announcement Seen, 19
INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 464 (June 28, 1983) [hereinafter cited as U.S. to
Ease Technology Controls]. For background on United States technology transfer to the Soviet
Union, see generally U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND
EAsT-WEsT TRADE: AN UPDATE (Apr. 1983) [hereinafter cited as OFFIcE OF TECHNOLOGY As-
SESSMENT: AN UPDATE]; Guzzardi, Cutting Russia's Harvest of US. Technology, FORTUNE, May,
1982, at 102.
15 See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
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advanced exports to China.17
I. DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROL POLICIES
TOWARD CHINA
A. History and Origin
The present United States export control system originates from
controls adopted during World War II, as a means of retaining United
States goods needed for the war effort.' 8 After World War II, these con-
trols were continued in order to facilitate an efficient and equitable distri-
bution of raw materials to the war-devastated nations of Europe and
Asia. By 1948, East-West relations had deteriorated to the point where
the United States imposed special controls on shipments of strategic
items to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.1 9 Finally, after several
political events-the Berlin Blockade, the Communist takeover of China,
and the outbreak of the Korean War-the controls were tightened fur-
ther, and virtually all exports to the Soviet bloc countries were
embargoed.2 °
As the Cold War escalated, the United States and her allies joined
together in 1949 to establish the Coordinating Committee for Multilat-
eral Export Controls ("COCOM"). 2 1 Through COCOM, Western in-
dustrial nations followed the United States lead in imposing tight
controls on exports of technology to the Soviet bloc. This policy lasted
until the end of the Korean War and the death of Stalin in 1954, when
trade restrictions to the Soviet bloc countries were relaxed.2 2 However,
17 See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
18 For an excellent background on the development of the U.S. export control policy toward
China, see Meese, Export Controls to China: An Emerging Trend for Dual-Use Exports, 7 INT'L
TRADE L.J. 20 (1982).
19 1d. at 22.
20 For a good review of the U.S. trade embargo against China from 1948-1970, see Lee &
McCobb, United States Trade Embargo on China, 1949-1980; Legal Status and Future Prospects, 4 J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 28 (1971).
21 COCOM provides an informal organization through which the allied countries can coordinate
national export controls of strategic materials and technology to all Communist countries. COCOM
was conceived in postwar discussions between the United States, Great Britain and France. By
1948, the United States Government began to enlist the cooperation of other Western European
allies for a coordinated embargo policy against the Communist bloc. Although early negotiations on
this matter were private and informal, they were stimulated by the events of 1948-49: the proclama-
tion of the People's Republic of China, the Berlin crisis, the Tito-Stalin split, and the explosion of the
Soviet atomic bomb. As East-West tensions grew, the coordination of export controls took on in-
creasing importance. See U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY
AND EAST-WEST TRADE 153 (Nov. 1979); see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: AN
UPDATE, supra note 14, at 44; Adler-Karlsson, International Economic Power: The Strategic Em-
bargo, 6 J. WORLD TRADE L. 501, 504 (1972).
22 Meese, supra note 18, at 23.
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the total embargo on trade with China remained. During this period,
COCOM's China Committee, CHINCOM, imposed more extensive re-
strictions on trade with China than on trade with the Soviet Union.23
This trade discrimination became known as the "China Differential."
During the mid-1950s, the European members of COCOM reduced
the restrictions on China, and in 1957, the CHINCOM list of restricted
items was officially abolished.24 The European allies eliminated the
"China Differential" by applying the same restrictions to both China and
the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the United States continued its total em-
bargo on China trade and unilaterally restricted the export of some 1,100
items that were freely available to Communist countries from COCOM
nations and other sources.25 By 1968, the United States was the only
country still actively engaged in "economic warfare" against the Chi-
nese.26 Thus, United States export control policy toward China was
firmly grounded in a "China Differential" policy at the outset of the
Nixon Administration.
B. Recent Trend in Export Controls to China
The recently enacted change in licensing regulations for exports to
China culminates an evolution that began with Nixon's historic visit to
the Chinese mainland and ensuing open door policy in 1972, and spans
four administrations. By 1972, the United States government, which had
formerly banned all trade with China, abandoned the embargo, and em-
barked on a policy of "evenhandedness" in economic relations with
China.2 7 The United States terminated its "China Differential" policy in
the mid-1970s and instead, placed trade with China on a similar basis as
that with the Soviet Union.28 Ironically, however, this evenhanded pol-
icy eroded soon thereafter in favor of a trend toward a new "China Dif-
ferential"-this time discriminating in favor of China.
The policy changed dramatically when the Soviet Union launched a
major invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979.29 In response to the
Russian d6marche, Washington imposed a variety of sanctions on the
23 A.D. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 263.
24 Id.
25 Meese, supra note 18, at 23.
26 Id.
27 OrmCE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: AN UPDATE, supra note 14, at 101.
28 Id.
29 A.D. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 552-56. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted Presi-
dent Carter to end his evenhanded approach toward Russia and China. The Russian move pro-
foundly affected the triangular relationship among Washington, Moscow, and Peking. Many U.S.
officials viewed closer security ties with China as a principal way for Washington to respond to
Soviet actions in Afghanistan.
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Soviet Union, one of which was to halt all sales of high technology to
that country. ° Mounting tension between the United States and Russia,
combined with a deepening Sino-United States political relationship, led
to a liberalization of United States export controls to China and to a
further differentiation between United States trade with the Soviet Union
and China. Defense Secretary Harold Brown announced that the United
States was willing to consider licensing exports of some "dual use" tech-
nology to China on a case-by-case basis,31 and in January, 1981, Con-
gress approved an agreement with China to encourage trade between the
two countries.32 Soon thereafter, the export regulations for China were
eased to reflect the friendly Sino-United States relationship,3 while the
government encouraged tighter controls on technology transfer to the
Soviet Union.34
Today, the Reagan Administration is deeply committed to a formal
differentiation between China and the Soviet Union, and has continued
to push for relaxed export controls to China. According to the Adminis-
tration, over the last few years, United States-China trade policy has re-
flected "our national interest to foster a strong, secure and friendly China
...and the need for a clear trade policy lending flexibility and predict-
ability to American businesses in trading with China, while ensuring our
national security, promoting foreign policy and protecting commercial
interests., 35 Thus, the most recent announcement establishing new li-
censing regulation's is but one more step toward showing preferred treat-
ment to China by facilitating increased trade relations between the two
countries.
II. THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT
A. Political Considerations and Scope of the Act
Since World War II, the United States export control system has
developed into an important tool of foreign economic policy. The policy
has been aimed primarily at preventing the flow of strategic military and
30 Id. at 553.
31 In 1980, Defense Secretary Harold Brown made a momentous trip to China for the purpose of
"exchanging views" on how Americans and Chinese might facilitate cooperation on security mat-
ters. The most important result of Brown's trip was the new policy affecting sales of high technology
to China. Brown announced that the United States would be receptive to Chinese requests to buy
dual use high technology equipment such as computers that could have military applications. Id. at
553-54.
32 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: AN UPDATE, supra note 14, at 101-02.
33 See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
34 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: AN UPDATE, supra note 14, at 66.
35 Notice to Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 385.3 (1984).
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high technology products and technical data of United States origin to
Communist countries.36 The broad guidelines for controlling restricted
exports are set by statute, and were codified most recently in the Export
Administration Act of 1979.37 While the Act is currently being revised
again to reflect new policies towards various countries, 38 including
China, the 1979 Act redefined the scope of the United States export regu-
lations by eliminating some outdated controls and by trying to provide
more certainty in the application of the laws.39
The controversy preceding the passage of the 1979 Act reflected
both disenchantment with Soviet-United States d6tente and a deepening
concern about the security implications of trade with Communist na-
tions, as well as pleas from United States exporters to remove restrictions
on non-military trade.' In passing the Act, Congress attempted to bal-
ance the need for expanded foreign trade against the need to restrict the
exportation of goods and technology that could "make a significant con-
tribution to the military potential of any other nation or nations which
would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States."
41
This dichotomy has characterized United States export control policy in
general, and specifically to Communist countries, like China, since the
policy originated in 1949.42
The recent political controversy as to whether the United States
should relax licensing restrictions on exports to China stems from the
general "balancing" debate between the conflicting policy goals of the
Export Administration Act. There are many arguments in favor of re-
stricting sales to China of weapons, or dual use technology that can be
easily used to improve Chinese military capabilities. Chinese interests in
and policies toward many nations and regions vary significantly from
those of non-Communist powers, and Chinese policy in those areas could
adversely affect United States interests in those areas.43 For example,
military technology transferred to China by the United States could be
used in such potential conflict areas as Korea, Indochina and the Taiwan
36 For a good background on the development of the Export Administration Act, in general, and
the Export Administration Act of 1979, in particular, see Evrard, The ExportAdministration Act Of
1979: Analysis Of Its Major Provisions And Potential Impact On United States Exporters, 12 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 1 (1982).
37 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (1982).
38 See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
39 See Evrard, supra note 36, at 3-4.
40 See OFFicE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: AN UPDATE, supra note 14, at 17-18.
41 50 U.S.C. § 2401(8) (1982); see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssEssMENT: AN UPDATE,
supra note 14, at 17.
42 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: AN UPDATE, supra note 14, at 17.
43 A.D. BARNETr, supra note 9, at 265.
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Strait.' In addition, sales of civilian technology with a potential for mil-
itary use, or outright sales of arms, could create an impression of closer
military-security ties between the exporting nations and China than in
fact exists, or than either the exporter or importer desires.45 This situa-
tion could arouse the apprehensions of China's smaller neighbors and
could create anxiety even in Japan.4 6 The greatest fear opponents of lib-
eralizing export controls for China have, however, is the concern that
dual use technology exported today could be used against the United
States tomorrow. 47
The history of United States-Soviet relations serves as a reminder
that caution should be exercised when transferring technology to a po-
tentially hostile country. Opponents of a liberalized China export policy
recall that the period of d6tente in the mid-1970s witnessed expanded
technology transfer to the Soviet Union through liberalized licensing pro-
cedures.4 8 Moreover, these commentators feel today that such Western
exports merely supported a Soviet military buildup to the detriment of
United States and Western security.49 Numerous agencies and govern-
ment officials have been blamed for short-sighted export policies during
that period.50 Opponents warn that policymakers may allow history to
repeat itself by hastily implementing a liberal China export policy.
In formulating policies and regulations, the Reagan Administration
must be aware of Soviet, as well as Chinese, anxieties. Another reason
against liberalizing export policies to China is the possible adverse reac-
tion of the Soviet Union which has shown increasing concern about
44Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. See also Lachica, U.S. Defense Secretary to Explore Sales of Military, Other Technology to
China, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1983, at 34, col. 4.
47 Senate Banking Committee Chairman Jake Garn (R-Utah) does not support substantially
reduced export controls on dual use technology to China. On September 20, 1983, Sen. Garn asked
his fellow congressmen: "How do we know that with regard to the Chinese we will not repeat our
experience with the Soviet Union and come to experience the use of our own technology against us?"
He noted that the Soviet missile which recently destroyed the Korean Airline "was probably a copy
of our own Sidewinder missile based in large part on U.S. technology." Garn Criticizes Major Con-
trols Change, Warns of Repeating Soviet Union Mistake, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY (BNA) 918 (Sept. 27, 1983). Soon after the Reagan Administration's announcement of the
new policy last June 1983, Sen. Garn expressed hope:
. . . that this Administration can avoid the same errors made in the early 1970's, during the era
of so-called d&tente, when the floodgates of technology were opened to the Soviet Union. The
Soviets got what they wanted to improve their military capability but refused to change their
aggressive, imperialist policies in response to our gesture of good will and friendship.
U.S. to Ease Technology Controls, supra note 14.
48 Export Administration Act" Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 91-2 (1983) (statement of Senator Mattingly).
49 Id. at 92.
50 See id. at 91-92.
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China's new relationship with the non-Communist industrial powers. 51
Though the Soviets believe that China cannot soon match them economi-
cally or militarily, they do fear the emergence of a more active anti-So-
viet coalition.52 Thus, Russia has opposed all sales of militarily useful
technology to China, and has denounced any evidence of close strategic
links between China and the Western industrial powers, fearing the pos-
sibility of Western involvement in any future conflicts between the Soviet
Union and China.53 Ironically, increases in sales of high technology to
the Chinese may only result in a more vigorous Soviet drive to counter-
balance the perceived danger by increasing its own defenses or by making
relations between the Superpowers even more tense.54 This could very
well weaken rather than strengthen the security of China and other East
Asian countries.
The arguments in favor of relaxing strategic controls on trade with
China are equally strong, and in fact prevailed, as evidenced by the new
export regulations.55 Most obvious, perhaps, is the potential for com-
mercial advantage by facilitating increased United States-China trade by
making technology transfer easier.56 Moreover, such increased trade
would aid in China's modernization drive and, therefore, have the benefit
of fostering stronger political ties between the two countries.57 Propo-
nents of a liberal export control policy for China claim that China is
unlikely to pose a threat to United States security interests without a
mass export of the most advanced military systems.58 In fact, many be-
lieve that increased technology transfer may prevent any potential for
instability in the region caused by a widening of the military gap between
51 A.D. BARNETr, supra note 9, at 266.
52 The Russians have warned that expanded economic, scientific and technical ties between
China and the West will help China develop its military capabilities and make it a threat in the
future. Most of all, Russia fears that transfers to China of high technology with obvious military
applications will prove to be precursors of close U.S.-China military ties. Id. at 551.
53 Id. at 265.
54 Heightened by a fear that the United States and China may form an alliance against the Soviet
Union, Moscow has stepped up their efforts to "encircle" China, politically and militarily, most
notably during 1978-79, by signing a treaty with Vietnam that greatly increased their commitment to
the Hanoi regime, which Moscow then backed in its invasion of Cambodia. Id. at 551.
55 See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
56 Former President Nixon said that the United States could reach total two-way trade with
China of $25 billion by 1993 and China could prove to be one of the most important U.S. trading
partners in the next century. US.-China Trade Could Reach $25 Billion by 1993, Nixon Says in
Washington Speech, 19 INTr'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 359 (June 7, 1983) [here-
inafter cited as U.S.-China Trade Could Reach $25 Billion].
57 Leadership Stability Seen as Key to Greater U.S. Trade, Modernization, [July-Dec.] 19 IN'L
TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 519 (July 12, 1983).
58 Hearings - testimony of W. Archey, supra note 7; see also Anderson, Kissinger Had a Key Role
in Shift on China, Wash. Post., Aug. 12, 1983, at C17, col. 4.
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China and the Soviet Union. 59
Another consideration in favor of relaxing export controls to China
is that relations between the United States and China are not the same as
those between the United States and the Soviet Union. China is rela-
tively weak economically, technologically and militarily, and there is
thus less danger that it will be able to divert imported technology to mili-
tary uses that could threaten United States interests.' Moreover, identi-
cal restrictions applied to both China and the Soviet Union may, in fact,
discriminate against China because of China's economic and military
weakness.61 Thus, the United States may claim, whether disingenuously
or not, that it is merely trying to help China compete in the world eco-
nomic system and with its neighbor..
The arguments surrounding the United States export policy for
technology transfer to China echo those used in determining the appro-
priate trade policy for every Communist country under the Export Ad-
ministration Act.62 The individual country regulations usually reflect
United States foreign policy/security attitudes toward and relationship
with that country, and the degree to which the United States desires to be
a trading partner with a particular country. It is this recurring balance
which must be carefully weighed when making broad guidelines under
the Export Administration Act in general.
On October 14, 1983, the Export Administration Act of 1979 offi-
cially expired.6 3 While Congress has allowed the Administration to con-
tinue to enforce the law, it is clear that the revised bills were delayed in
meeting the deadline because of disagreement over, inter alia, the appro-
priate balance between national security interests and economic/business
concerns." Yet, while the issues involved are essentially the same now as
when the Act was first promulgated, the risks today may be higher. An
increasingly complex and delicate world situation poses a greater chal-
lenge to the Act's current drafters than that faced by their predecessors:
Worldwide recession and the state of the domestic economy have made the
encouragement of exports, the maintenance of established trading relation-
59 A.D. BARNETr, supra note 9, at 264-65.
60 Id. at 264.
61 Id. at 264-65.
62 See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
63 Congress allowed the Administration to extend the Act until February 29, 1984, under certain
emergency powers granted under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The export
control law was allowed to expire, owing to Congress' failure to enact a reauthorization bill. Con-
gress Extends Export Control Law, AVIATION & SPACE TECH., Nov. 28, 1982, at 29.
64 See Export Controls: Views Abound, Time Runs Out, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1983, at 23; Her-
shey, Export Act Expiration Draws Olmer Warning, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1983, at 1, col. 5; House
Softens Bill Curbing President on Export Powers, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1983, at 7, col. 1.
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ships, and the development of new export markets of critical importance to
the United States as well as to Europe and Japan. Meanwhile, evidence of
the extent and nature of the Soviet military buildup, coupled with Soviet
aggression in Afghanistan and events in Poland have intensified awareness
of the importance of safeguarding U.S. national security through protecting
technological leads. Ironically, it has become simultaneously more impor-
tant to sell to and to withhold U.S. goods from the Communist world. 65
The drafters of the pending Export Administration Act, thus, face the
task of balancing traditionally conflicting goals in the face of an increas-
ingly sensitive foreign policy context.
C. Licensing Technology for Export Under the Export
Administration Act: General Process and Procedure
The mechanics of implementing the broad guidelines contained in
the Export Administration Act have been left predominantly to adminis-
trative regulatory action,66 which allows for the flexibility needed to
adapt to changing political situations. Thus, a system of export controls
has emerged,67 which details the licensing review process by the adminis-
trative departments and reflects the different treatment given by the
United States to each of its foreign trading partners.68
Most United States exports of goods and technical data are con-
trolled by the United States Office of Export Administration ("OEA") of
the Department of Commerce. The OEA derives its authority from the
Export Administration Act of 1979,69 and implements its policies
through the Export Administration Regulations.70 It is through these
regulations that licenses are either issued to or withheld from United
States exporters desiring to sell their products abroad.71 The regulations
provide for two main types of licenses authorizing the exportation of
goods. The "general license" permits export of certain commodities and
technical data without filing an application with the OEA.72 The "vali-
dated license" requires a document issued by, or under the authority of,
65 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: AN UPDATE, supra note 14, at 21.
66 50 U.S.C. § 24 03 (c) (1982).
67 Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-99 (1984).
68 See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
69 50 U.S.C. § 2404 (1982).
70 15 C.F.R. § 370.1(c) (1984).
71 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399.1 (1984).
72 15 C.F.R. § 371.1 (1984); The two main types of general licenses are the general and specific:
(1) The general, G-DEST (certain product exports to all destinations), authorizes the export
of any commodity listed on the Commodity Control List to any destiation for which a
validated license is not required.
(2) The specific, GVL (small value exports), authorizes the export in a single shipment of any
commodity on the Commodity Control List.
See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
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the OEA, which legally authorizes the specific export. 73 Whether a com-
modity is shipped under a validated or under a general license, or not at
all, depends primarily upon whether the Commerce Department has
listed the particular commodity on the Commodities Control List
("CCL").74 The CCL is a complete listing of commodities subject to
licensing control by the OEA based on (1) the destination of the export,
75
and (2) the type of commodity or technical data to be transferred.76
For purposes of commodity control, the countries of the world (ex-
cept Canada) are assigned to specific "country groups" in which one or
more countries are placed at one of three general levels of restrictive-
ness.77 China, for example, was orginally placed on the most restrictive
level, Country Group Z, together with Cuba, North Korea and North
Vietnam.78 Shortly after the termination of the trade embargo with
73 See Comment, The Regulation of Technical Data Under The Arms Export Control Act of 1976
and The Export Administration Act of 1979: A Matter of Executive Discretion, 6 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. RaV. 169, 189-90 (1983). The OEA issues validated export licenses upon receipt of an export
license application. The applicant must disclose to the OEA all details of the transaction, the dis-
tinction and type of technical data to be exported, the intended use of the technical data, and the
foreign availability of comparable data. On a case-by-case basis, the OEA uses this information to
determine whether it will grant a validated license. Id. at 190.
74 Id. at 189.
75 See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
76 15 C.F.R. Part 399.1 (1984). The OEA maintains the CCL which includes all commodities
subject to U.S. Dept. of Commerce export controls. The CCL presently contains over 200 entries
grouped in the following ten categories:
Group 0: Metal-working machinery
Group 1: Chemical and Petroleum Equipment
Group 2: Electrical and Power-Generating Equipment
Group 3: General Industrial Equipment
Group 4: Transportation Equipment
Group 5: Electronics and Precision Instruments
Group 6: Metals, Minerals, and their Manufactures
Group 7: Chemcial, Metalloids, and Petroleum Products
Group 8: Rubber and Rubber Products
Group 9: Miscellaneous
Id.
77 See generally 15 C.F.R. § 370 Supp. 2 (1984), as amended. Today, the foreign countries of the
world (except Canada) are separated into seven country groups designated by the symbols "Q", "s",
-171, ..V", ."W", "Y", and "1z".
Country Group Q: Romania
Country Group S: Libya
Country Group T: Includes most Central and South American Countries plus Greenland
Country Group V: Includes Southern Rhodesia and all NATO countries and Japan, and
recently the People's Republic of China
Country Group W: Hungary and Poland
Country Group Y: Includes the Soviet Union and most of the Soviet bloc countries
Country Group Z: North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Kampuchea.
Id.
78 JoINT ECONOMIC COMM., 97th CONG., 2D SESS., CHINA UNDER THE FOUR MODERIZA-
TIONS: PART 2, 162 (Joint Comm. Print 1982). China was placed in Group Z for two decades
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China in 1971, China was placed in Country Group Y at the middle level
of restrictiveness, with the Warsaw Pact countries.7 9 Since then, changes
in the export control policy combined with the gradual improvement in
United States commercial relations with China, prompted the transfer of
China, as of April 25, 1980, from Group Y to its own category, Country
Group P.80 In Country Group P, China was generally left at the same
level of restrictiveness, but the category provided for some preferential
treatment. 81 Most recently, in November, 1983, China's country group
status under the Export Administration Regulations became even less
restrictive when the Reagan Administration announced that China
would be moved into Country Group V along with the United States
NATO allies and other friendly but non-aligned countries.82 Thus, the
country group determination reflects current United States export con-
trol policy to the various countries.
Most applications are approved by the OEA without referral to
other agencies. Sometimes, however, the application is referred directly
to the agency that possesses the special expertise in the technologies in-
volved in the application.8 3 For example, the Secretary of Defense must
"review any proposed export of any goods or technology to any country
to which exports are controlled for national security purposes," which
includes most Communist countries.84 In fact, the Department of De-
fense and the Department of Commerce manifest the two competing in-
terests inherent in the Export Administration Act, and the two
Departments often clash as to which one should have the ultimate con-
trol over the licensing decision.85 Once the OEA has decided to grant a
validated license for a particular export, that commodity may be trans-
ferred unless it is one on COCOM's list of internationally embargoed
products and therefore, subject to COCOM review.86 Though technolog-
following the Communist takeover in 1949 during the embargo that the United States imposed on
trade with the People's Republic of China after the direct involvement of the Communist Chinese in
the Korean War. Id. at 161 n.15.
79 Id. at 162
80 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(c) (1984).
81 See supra note 78.
82 See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
83 Whereas the Dept. of Commerce is primarily concerned with the economic and commercial
implications of export control, other governmental offices administer control over commodities and
data that come within their special regulatory jurisdiction. The CCL does not apply to these special-
ized commodities and data. Instead, the other agencies promulgate export regulations for the com-
modities and technical data under its jurisdicton.
84 50 U.S.C. § 2409(g) (1982).
85 See Commerce, DOD Clash Over Export Controls, Electronic News, Mar. 7, 1983, at 6, col. I.
86 See 50 U.S.C. § 2404(i) (1982). COCOM has two basic functions: to maintain a list of strate-
gic goods and technologies which may be embargoed or monitored and to secure agreement on
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ically advanced exports destined for Communist countries are subject to
COCOM review," the export may be transferred"8 once COCOM ap-
proves the application.89
III. NEW EXPORT REGULATIONS FOR TRANSFERRING TECHNOLOGY
TO CHINA
A. Substantive Changes in China Export Policy Under the Export
Administration Regulations
After months of interagency study, the Reagan Administration an-
nounced in late November of 1983 the new export regulations for the
transfer of technology to China.90 The new technical guidelines gov-
erning exports to China cover seven areas judged by the Administration
to be most important to China's modernization program. These areas
include computers, computerized instruments, microcircuits, electronic
instruments, recording equipment, semiconductor production equipment
and oscilloscopes. 91 Items in these categories will receive expeditious li-
cense review. In addition, the various Administration agencies and de-
partments will continue to develop further technical guidelines for
technology transfer in areas not listed above.92 The new regulations are
substantially more liberal than those of the past, and are expected not
only to facilitate a more efficient and effective export system to China,
but also to enhance United States-China trade.
93
One significant feature of the more liberal export control policy to-
ward China is the nation's removal from Country Group P, a designation
previously consisting of China alone and now one that has been dropped
from the regulations, to its placement in Country Group V, which in-
cludes Western Europe, India, all of Africa except Libya, the Arab coun-
tries, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.94 The move from Country
measures designed to prevent re-export of controlled items, thus limiting the build-up of the military
potential of Communist countries. Embargoed items fall into three principal categories: those used
in arms production, those used in military technology, and those with military significance intended
for areas in short supply.
87 Id.
88 For further discussion and analysis on COCOM, see infra notes 116-26 and accompanying
text.
89 COCOM must either approve or deny the application within 90 days of its receipt and notice
may be given to the exporter within that period.
90 15 C.F.R. §§ 368.2 (1984).
91 Hearings - testimony of W. Archey, supra note 7.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(c) (1984), supra note 3; see generally U.S. to Ease Technology Controls,
supra note 14; Brown, Export Control" The Meaning Behind China's New Status as a "Friendly" but
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Group P to Group V "is intended to emphasize that sales to China
should take place on a similar basis as to most other friendly coun-
tries."95 For China, however, there is an important qualification to its
status as a Group V country. The stipulation is that national security
review will be retained for license applications to China. 96 The Depart-
ment of Defense thus retains the right to place restrictions on certain
products and technologies which concern United States national secur-
ity.9 7 Consequently, there will be a continued requirement for validated
licenses in some cases,98 and probable denial of others. 99 Nevertheless,
"licenses may be approved even when the end-user or end-use [is] mili-
tary. Commodities or data may be approved for export even though they
may contribute to Chinese military development. ' '"" ° Thus, the new reg-
ulations specifically state the legality of transferring dual use technology,
although such export applications will be subject to national security
review.
The Reagan Administration believes that the new regulations estab-
lish clear and predictable guidelines for technology transfer, coordinate
the licensing process, and allow for the transfer of technologically ad-
vanced commodities and data to China without impairing United States
national security.101 The new export policy will achieve these goals by
classifying dual use commodities into three categories-the "green," "in-
termediate" and "red" zones-reflecting increasing complexity of license
approval."2 Applications for items within the green zone-those items
Non-Allied Country, CHINA Bus. REv. July-Aug. 1983, at 9; Reagan Says China Can Buy Com-
puters, Technology with Potential Military Uses, Wall St. J., at 7, col. I; Baldridge Raises High-Tech
Hopes, Bus. WK., June 13, 1983, at 58.
95 U.S. to Ease Technology Controls, supra note 14, at 463 (statement by Commerce Secretary
Malcolm Baldridge).
96 Hearings - testimony of W. Archey, supra note 7.
97 See supra notes 84-85.
98 The Reagan Administration has not defined precisely in which cases a validated license will be
required. For a discussion of new zone classifications, see infra text accompanying notes 101-10.
99 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(c) (1984). "There are certain commodities, data, and end-uses that may
require extended review or denial. Of particular concern are exports that would make a direct and
significant contribution to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, electronic and anti-submarine
warfare, intelligence gathering, power projection, and air superiority."
100 Id.
101 Hearings - testimony of W. Archey, supra note 7.
102 Id.; see Reagan Administration Announces New P.R.C Technology Transfer Guidelines, 20
INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 303 (Nov. 22, 1983); see generally Most Applica-
tions Would be in Green Zone With New Technology Policy, Baldridge Says, 20 INT'L TRADE REP.
U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 9 (Oct. 4, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Most Applications Would be in
Green Zone]; China and America: Green for Reagan, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1982, at 29; Talking High
Tech With Weinberger, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 1983, at 68; Green Will Mean Go on US. Sales of Dual-
Use Items to P.R.C, BusINEss CHINA, Sept. 28, 1983, at 137.
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representing minimum national security risks-will generally receive
routine approval. 10 3 Products and technology falling within this cate-
gory may be approved directly by the Commerce Department without
necessitating Defense Department or interagency review. 104 Commerce
Department officials estimate that seventy-five percent of all China appli-
cations will fall within the green zone, and will be routinely approved.'
The second, intermediate zone covers license applications for "very high
technology and will require case-by-case review by the Defense Depart-
ment and other agencies, as appropriate."'0 6 Intermediate zone items
will have a presumption of approval and will be approved unless the item
involved "poses a clear threat to the United States security interest."'0 7
The red zone includes "the most advanced technologies which would
have direct applications to advanced military systems," and therefore,
would pose a clear threat to United States security.' Applications for
items within this category are those "which we usually would not share
even with our closest allies;" hence, red zone items will have a strong
presumption for denial and the list itself will remain classified.'1 9 In or-
der to administer effectively the new zone classifications, a senior inter-
agency group under the direction of the National Security Council will
conduct quarterly reviews of progress in implementing the new policy.
In addition, it will review the three zones and make changes as
103 Hearings - testimony of W. Archey, supra note 7. Archey stated that items in the green zone
receiving expeditious license review will include most medium scale main frame computers with data
processing rates up to 155 megabits/see. Previously, computers with processing rates as low as 32
megabits/sec. required lengthy interagency review. Moreover, the current 14 technical parameters
to be examined when computer exports are reviewed will be cut to five. In the area of microcom-
puters, almost all commercially available 16-Bit microcomputers will be routinely exportable to
China. (Under the old policy, these would have been subject to lengthy interagency review usually
resulting in routine denials of most machines). Routine approval will also apply to production
equipment for large-scale integrated circuits, oscilloscopes and instruments used to measure per-
formances of electronic equipment and circuits, and most instruments incorporating digital com-
puters. Id. See also Mann, US. Relaxes Rules on Exports to China, AVIATION & SPACE TECH.,
Dec. 5, 1983, at 167.
104 Hearings - testimony of W. Archey supra note 7.
105 Id.
106 Id. The specific commodities falling within this zone have not been outlined by the Com-
merce Department at this time. However, the details of this zone are to be articulated in 1984.
107 Id. This change is extremely significant in that it shifts the burden of proof on the national
security issue from those who wish to export to those who recommend against a particular export.
Previously, nothing could be exported to China unless it clearly could be approved according to
precedent or guidelines. Now, companies will be able to export anything except for goods and tech-
nology which have been prohibited or restricted for national security purposes. See Export Controlh"
The Meaning Behind China's New Status as a "Friendly" But Non-Allied Country, supra note 94, at
9.
108 Hearings - testimony of W. Archey, supra note 7.




The immediate effect of the new licensing regulations will be to free
seventy-five percent of the China applications for dual use technology
from time-consuming review by the Commerce, Defense and State De-
partments. The products will be routinely exported as if they were des-
tined for non-Communist countries."' Only the most sensitive
technology, particularly that which can be incorporated into advanced
weapons systems, will be denied export privileges or become subject to
close scrutiny.1 2 Moreover, the liberalized licensing standards are ex-
pected to boost the value of high technology trade to between $1.5 - $2
billion in 1984, compared to an estimated $1 billion in 1983, and up from
$350 million in 1982.11 The equipment and technology to be provided
under the policy, essentially raises the level of commodities and technical
data available to China to the level of technology acquired by other large
developing countries. 1 4 Moreover, it is expected by Administration offi-
cials that not only will the high technology companies substantially bene-
fit from the relaxed export controls, but also the oil and gas industry will
be helped by the new guidelines because of the relaxed technical data
rules.
1 15
B. COCOM: Multilateral Control Obligations on Exports to China
Although the liberalized regulations are certain to speed up trade
between the United States and China, China will still be subject to export
screening rules promulgated by COCOM, the informal Coordinating
Committee of the Western allies and Japan that establishes and monitors
multilateral controls on exports to Communist nations. 1 6 COCOM's
main function is to review export license applications submitted by mem-
ber countries on behalf of their domestic companies. 17 Commerce De-
110 Hearings - testimony of W. Archey, supra note 7. The membership of the group is to include
the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Commerce and Energy, the CIA, NSC, and various
U.S. trade representatives. P.R.C. Agreement on Reexport Assurances, Block to Policy Announce-
ment, Seen Close, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 50 (Oct. 11, 1983).
111 Lachica, US. Outlines Technology Gear China Can Buy, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1983, at 36, col.
3.
112 Id.
113 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Nov. 17, 1983) (testimony of Donald M. An-
derson, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings - testimony ofD. Anderson].
114 Id.
115 Reagan Administration Announces New P.R.C. Technology Transfer Guidelines, supra note
102, at 304.
116 See supra notes 86-88; for historical background, see supra note 21.
117 Western exports to China are controlled mutilaterally by COCOM, whereby license applica-
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partment officials have announced that the new United States export
policy for China "is also being closely coordinated with our COCOM
allies so that we can continue to honor our multilateral control obliga-
tions."11' 8 Officials noted that consultation with COCOM countries will
continue with the goal of further reducing obstacles to the transfer of
increased dual use technology to China.' In 1983, COCOM considered
825 United States-China cases, but it is estimated that the United States
will send 3,500 cases to COCOM in 1984.120 This may lead to a "bottle-
neck" of cases in COCOM because of the Administration's new policy of
expediting the license process for China applications. 2' However, the
Administration claims it has consulted carefully with United States allies
about the policy and the technical details, and the reaction of these coun-
tries has apparently been favorable.'22 The United States hopes to imple-
ment the speedy system in COCOM by increasing the organization's
funding and staff, increasing the frequency of the courier service to
COCOM from once to three times a week, and providing more telecom-
munications equipment to facilitate communciation between COCOM
and the member countries.'
23
The obvious economic benefits to be obtained by the United States
from expanded exportation to China have not been overlooked by
COCOM members for they "are well aware of the competititve problems
that they would encounter" from this new policy. 124 During the last two
years, for example, the United States has had more requests for license
approval for exports to China than all other COCOM members com-
bined. 12  The Administration insists, however, that it has "made it clear
tions above a certain threshold technological level must be submitted by the U.S. government for
COCOM review, even if the United States has first approved the export for one of its companies. See
Mann, supra note 103.
118 Remarks by U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Malcolm Baldridge reported in Green Will Mean
Go On U.S. Sales of Dual- Use Items to P.R. C, supra note 102, at 138.
119 Reagan Administration Announces New P.R. C. Technology Transfer Guidelines, supra note
102, at 304. A recurring COCOM problem is that the member countries each have different atti-
tudes toward the items proposed for control. There is often tension between COCOM members and
the United States generated over the desire of COCOM members to make U.S. security interests
secondary to their own trade interests. See Evrard, supra note 36, at 22 n.85.
120 Reagan Administration Announces New P.R.C. Technology Transfer Guidelines, supra note
102, at 304.
121 Under current policy, the COCOM review takes up to 90 days. To expedite the process, the
United States will ask COCOM to treat its green list items expeditiously. Mann, supra note 103, at
171.
122 Reagan Administration Announces New P.R.C. Technology Transfer Guidelines, supra note
102, at 304.
123 Id. at 305; see Hearings - testimony ofD. Anderson supra note 113.
124 Mann, supra note 103, at 23.
125 Most Applications Would be in Green Zone, supra note 102, at 11.
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to our allies that we do not intend to manipulate this system in any way
to take commercial advantage and we do not expect other countries to do
so. ' 1 26 While COCOM may be willing to cooperate, and indeed it must
in order for the new system to work properly, it is not yet clear whether
allied nations will comply or whether some members may request the
same treatment from the United States concerning technology trade with
the Soviet Union to further their own trade interests.
C. Problems with the Previous Licensing Guidelines: Purpose and
Effect of the New Changes
The Reagan Administration's China export policy has been ambigu-
ous and inconsistent since 1981. In that year, the President announced
his decision to promote "a secure, friendly and modernized China" by
permitting the export to that country of equipment and technology at
technical levels twice as sophisticated as that approved for the Soviet
Union before its invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979.127 The
mechanics of implementing the policy, however, were unclear and un-
workable. 28 The system proved essentially to be one of optimistic rheto-
ric and cosmetic shifts in policy to placate the United States business
community. 129 The Chinese asserted that, in practice, United States ex-
port controls did not reflect the President's supposedly more liberal pol-
icy and, in fact, the controls were usually applied arbitrarily and
capriciously.'30 The standard was impractical partly because even ex-
ports below the "two-times" threshold were subject to an interagency
national security review that delayed the licensing process.' 31 Lack of
cooperation particularly between the Department of Commerce and the
Department of Defense,132 the failure of the Administration to coordi-
nate its policies with those of its foreign allies, 133 and its own unpredict-
126 Hearings - testimony ofD. Anderson, supra note 113.
127 Hearings - testimony of W. Archey, supra note 7.
128 See U.S. May Block Sale of Electronic Gear to China Firm, Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1983, at 39,
col. 2; Manning, Softer Line on Hardware, CHINA TRADE REP., July 1983, at 8.
129 Id.
130 Who's in Charge Here, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Apr. 7, 1983, at 28; see also STAFF
OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON UNITED
STATES TRADE RELATIONS wrrH CHINA AND JAPAN 8 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as
ENERGY AND COMMERCE REPORT].
131 Mann, supra note 103, at 167; see also Hearings - testimony of W. Archey, supra note 7. The
"two-times" threshold refers to the prior U.S. policy of selling to the Chinese technology two times
more advanced than that sold to the Soviet Union. Id.
132 See Commerce, DOD Clash Over Export Controls, supra note 85; see also U.S.-China Trade
Could Reach $25 Billion, supra note 56, at 359.
133 Schultz Fails to Calm Troubed Waters, Bus. WK., Feb. 21, 1983, at 49.
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able policies134 all contributed to the President's decision in 1983 to
reformulate his policies and redraft the regulations.
Since 1981, the Administration has discouraged United States ex-
porters from selling their products to China by long licensing delays de-
spite the fact that the same goods were available from other Western
countries whose licensing restrictions were not so strict. 135 This situation
has caused some United States companies to lose Chinese orders to the
more cooperative foreign trading partner. With this in mind, United
States businesspeople have argued that the export regulations are self-
defeating when the Chinese can purchase the same items produced by the
United States from Western Europe or Japan without the nettlesome de-
lays. 136 Without coordinating its policies with its allies, United States
restrictions have been pointless and counterproductive. The new export
regulations, however, are expected to resolve the foreign availability
problem through coordination with COCOM allies.
The length of time the various departments and agencies often took
to process a license application was another obstacle preventing effective
trade with Communist countries, or substantially controlled nations.
For many United States firms a lengthy review process can jeopardize
existing contracts with China. 3 7 This particularly hurts small firms
lacking the financial resources to endure such delays. 138 For example,
where an item may be potentially licensable, a customs agent might post-
pone the shipment until either the Department of Commerce or Defense
Department, or both, approve the item. 139 Frequent occurrences of this
134 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: AN UPDATE, supra note 14, at 102. For example, in
June 1982, Ambassador Stroessel, speaking to the National Council on United States-China Trade,
characterized China as "a friendly country with which we are not allied, but with which we share
many common interests." Simultaneously, the Administration tightened its licensing policy towards
China in response to intelligence reports of technology leakage to it and the Soviet Union. Then, in
September 1982, the Reagan Administration licensed the sale to China of a sophisticated computer
used in the United States for simulating misssile flights. Id. See also Weisskopf, Chinese Trade
Issues Seen Snagging Schultz, Wash. Post, Jan. 31, 1983, at A12, col. 4.
135 Zonderman, Policing High-Tech Exports, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1983, sec. 6, at 100; see also
High Technology Firms Seek Relaxation of Export Administration Act Strictures [Jan.-June] 18 INT'L
TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 517 (Jan. 4, 1983); see Schultz Fails to Calm Troubled
Waters, supra note 133.
136 Zonderman, Policing High-Tech Exports, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1983, sec. 6, at 100; see also
High Technology Firms Seek Relaxation of Export Administration Act Strictures [Jan.-June] 18 INT'L
TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 517 (Jan. 4, 1983); see Schultz Fails to Calm Troubled
Waters, supra note 133.
137 See Jacobs, Small Firms Upset by Efforts to Limit High-Tech Exports, Wall St. J., Apr. 4,
1983, at 19, col. I.
138 Id.
139 Id. Consider CSI Technologies, Inc., a small firm, which sold capacitors to Bombay. The
shipment was delayed from a West Coast port because the custom officials did not know whether the
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problem detract from the reputation of United States firms and their
credibility as reliable suppliers. In addition, this situation often forces
small firms to export without regard to the export regulations.' 40 More-
over, given the thousands of items on the Commodity Control List, it is
not always clear whether a product comes under its control. Thus, some
smaller firms decide to forego compliance with the regulations at sub-
stantial time and expense, and accept the risk of exporting illegally.
141
The new regulations have sought to remedy this problem by making the
system clearer and more efficient for large and small firms alike.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW EXPORT POLICY ON
UNITED STATES TRADE
A. China's Development Plan
The potential for marked increases in United States high technology
exports to China lies not so much in the purchasing power of China's one
billion consumers as it does in the needs of the Chinese government's
ambitious development plan. 42 Soon after the death of Mao Tse-Tung
in 1976, and the purge of the Maoist Gang of Four in 1977, China's new
leaders instituted a nationwide industrialization program in order "to
make China a fully developed nation by the end of the century through
rapid modernization of its agriculture, industry, military establishment
and science and technology."' 43 The "Four Modernizations" program
has had far reaching effects not only on China itself, but also on its inter-
national relations. China's leaders recognized immediately that the
country would need to expand foreign trade substantially and increase
imports of plants, machinery equipment, managment know-how, and sci-
entific and technical knowledge, especially from the advanced capitalist
nations, in order to implement their program." 4 This orientation con-
trasted sharply with that of the 1960s and 1970s, when "self-reliance"
had been stressed as one of the country's fundamental principles. 45
product required an export license. The government review process took three months, added sub-
stantial costs to the small firm and affected its business relations with its buyer. The $100,000 ship-
ment was the first shipment of a $1 million order contingent upon satisfactory deilvery of the first
part. Id.
140 Chipex Pleads Guilty in U.S. Export Case, Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1983, at p. 2, col. 3; see
also Caught in the Swinging Door of US. Policy on China, BusiNESS WK., Oct. 3, 1983, at 124.
141 See Zonderman, supra note 135.
142 ENERGY AND COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 130, at 7. For a superb insight into United
States-China trade for the future, see China Policy For The Next Decade, REPORT OF THE ATLANTIC
COUNCIL'S COMMITTEE ON CHINA POLICY, Oct., 1983.
143 See A.D. BANETrr, supra note 9, at 122-49.
144 Id.
145 H. Harding, Jr., CHINA AND THE U.S. - NORMALIZATION AND BEYOND 15 (1981). During
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Now the Chinese are clamoring for Western technology and, therefore,
view the United States as a particularly valuable trading partner. 146 In
turn, United States exporters are anxious to fill China's orders generated
by China's modernization plan.
United States businesspeople, particularly those engaged in the com-
puter industry, are enthusiastic about the Reagan Administration's re-
cent decision to liberalize export controls for China because of that
country's potentially large market.147 Indeed, China lags years, if not
decades, behind industrialized Western countries in terms of computer
resources, and United States computer vendors are anxious to supply
China with as much technology and technical data as China demands
and the United States government will permit. 48 Though the United
States has given a "green light" to sellers of dual use commodities previ-
ously banned from export, there is a substantial likelihood that United
States exporters may face other obstacles and risks in engaging in in-
creased levels of trade with China.
B. Potential Problem Areas in Future United States-China Trade
Perhaps the greatest potential problem area for United States ex-
porters, now that trade restrictions have been eased, may be their igno-
rance of important economic, cultural and political differences between
the two countries, and their inexperience in dealing with the Chinese
market. United States businesspeople may encounter difficulties in un-
derstanding Chinese commercial practices and may confront problems in
trying to communicate with the end-users of United States goods.1 49
United States vendors of high technology will have to identify the end-
users in China's fledgling computer sector, determine their needs and
then seek out the party or parties who make the purchase decisions.
1 50
Furthermore, China's leaders, aware of their country's pressing needs to
computerize, want to develop a technological infrastructure where the
means of production are backward. 5' Thus, those United States export-
the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), China's radical leaders had warned that reliance on foreign trade
would be inherently corruptible and would cause China to become dependent on the West. How-
ever, after Mao's death, China's new leadership began to argue the opposite-that China could mod-
ernize only by drawing on the advanced experience and technology of other countries.
146 ENERGY AND COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 130, at 11.
147 Laberis, New Rules Ease High-Tech Trade With China, COMPUtERWORLD, July 4, 1983, at
51.
148 Id.
149 See ENERGY AND COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 130, at 5-11.





ers selling semiconductor manufacturing and systems testing equipment
will have to be particularly patient with a nation that still performs many
complex industrial procedures by hand.' 52
It is possible that the United States exporters may find stiff competi-
tion once they start investing in the Chinese technology market. Their
European and Japanese counterparts already are firmly entrenched in the
Chinese market and, therefore, are more familiar with the nuances of
doing business there.15 3 The Chinese may be more interested in dealing
with those countries rather than with the United States if it is more effi-
cient to do so. The Japanese, for example, have full-time trading officials
in many locations throughout China.'5 4 If United States businesses ex-
pect to make serious progress and reap the rewards of developing the
Chinese technology market, they will have to adopt long-term strategies
rather than short-term, "quick money" goals as they have evidenced in
the past.'
55
Another possible problem area is the limited ability of the Chinese
to assimilate the transferred technology. 156 If the technology being
transferred is of an appropriate level of sophistication for Chinese techni-
cians and it is transferred under workable terms, a United States com-
pany stands to enter the market as a pioneer in the new market area. If,
however, the technology is not absorbed and applied smoothly by the
Chinese partner, or if the end product is too sophisticated for the de-
mands of the Chinese market, the company stands to lose both money
and its initial market position. 157 The Chinese cannot, and perhaps may
not desire to, assimilate the more advanced United States technology.
158
China currently lacks the industrial production, technology, personnel or
systems to build high technology components or systems.1 59 Thus, the
Chinese market for highly advanced technology may be limited and some
United States firms may become dissatisfied with their investment abroad
and pull out of the market.
Another possible constraint on United States exports to China may
include China's ability to pay for them.1" China's credit rating is cur-
rently excellent, but this could change if the country takes on more debt
152 Id.
153 ENERGY AND COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 130, at 10-12.
154 Id. at 10-11.
155 Id. at 11.
156 Brown, The ITT Story, CHINA Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 40, 42.
157 Id.
158 ENERGY AND COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 130, at 9.
159 Id.
160 China Policy for the Next Decade, supra note 142, at 27; see also Harding, supra note 145, at
19.
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than its economy can repay.161 Difficulties in financing could discourage
or even cancel import contracts with foreign investors. In fact, as the
way opens for more technology transfer, United States companies are
finding their Chinese counterparts pressing hard for joint ventures. 62
The unwillingness of United States firms to share the equity and risks in
the new market could sacrifice key contracts to more flexible
competitors.
Potential impediments to the growth of United States-China trade
also stem from policies and practices in China. A notable example is
China's lack of legal protection for foreign technology. 63 Although
China has recently created trademark, patent and copyright laws,"
these laws are still undeveloped and, therefore, the legal rules in these
areas for foreign investors are still unclear or unpredictable. This is an
area that any United States firm contemplating doing business in China
will have to consider before embarking on a zealous exportation of com-
modities to China.
Finally, the prospects for rapidly growing and smooth trading rela-
tions between the United States and China will depend greatly upon the
political relations between the two countries. During his recent visit to
the United States, China's Prime Minister, Zhao Ziyang, made clear that
the political climate would continue to affect China's economic dealings
with the United States for although "economic matters are different from
political matters, . . . in the final analysis they are not absolutely sepa-
rate." '165 The sensitivity between United States-China political and eco-
nomic relations is evidenced clearly by several events of 1983-the
defection of tennis star Ha Nu,'6 6 the Manchu Bonds recovery,' 67 the
ongoing textile dispute over trade arrangements, 168 and arms sales by the
161 See Farnsworth, supra note 13.
162 Brown, supra note 156, at 42.
163 China Policy for the Next Decade, supra note 142, at 33.
164 The Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China, CHINA LAW REl'., No. 2 (Baker &
McKenzie Trans. Summer 1982), at 111.
165 Wren, Chinese Premier Bids U.S. Keep Pledge on Taiwan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1984, sec. A, at
6, col. 1; e.g., Prime Minister Zhao warned that political differences could affect China's commit-
ment to purchase six million tons of wheat in 1984 just as they affected China's refusal to buy in
1983; see Broder, China Defines Taiwan Policy for U.S. Talks, Chicago Trib., Jan. 14, 1984, at 1, col.
6; see also Farnsworth, U.S. to Sign Accord With Peking For Closer Industrial Cooperation, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 4, 1984, at Al, col. 3.
166 Bennett, China-U.S. Ties Survive Hu Na Flap, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 1983, at 39, ol. 2.
167 China Memo Handed to Secretary Schultz Asks U.S. to Drop Manchu Bonds Judgment, Wall
St. J., Feb. 10, 1983, at 34, col. 2.
168 Parks, Threatened With Textile Duty, China Warns U.S. of Trade Repercussions, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 18, 1983, at 67, col. 3.
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United States to Taiwan. 169 The Taiwan issue is a particularly sensitive
issue between the two countries because the Chinese have struggled for
centuries to reunify their country and "there is no room for China to
make any concessions on the question of Taiwan."170 This is extremely
significant because of the trading relationship the United States has had
with Taiwan for decades.171 While the political relationship between the
United States and China will set the tone for economic relations between
the two countries, China's internal politicial climate will also have a
profound effect on the extent of United States-China trade.
Ideological vestiges of China's recent past 172 are likely to remain in
the minds of its people for some time to come. There are many persons
within China who, while welcoming Western help in industrial develop-
ment, question the cost to national pride at which it is being bought. 173
At some point in the future the Chinese may come to resent Western
technological influences.174 Such firmness on matters of national pride is
especially prevalent during periods of internal change and shifting polit-
ical sentiment, which China has been going through since the death of
Mao and the institution of the "Four Modernizations" program. More-
over, China may become politically unstable again when Chinese leader,
Deng Xiaoping, almost eighty years of age, passes from the scene. 175 In-
ternal strife often affects external affairs.
For now though, the United States and China are both making nec-
essary concessions toward devising a mutually beneficial and workable
trade system. The United States has already eased restrictions on ship-
ments of technology to China, settled a potentially disruptive textile dis-
pute and worked for the admisison of China to a number of international
organizations. 176 Prime Minister Zhao, on the other hand, has agreed
not to press President Reagan to halt all sales of military hardware to
Taiwan, despite his earlier harsh stance on the issue.177 Moreover, China
is in the process of drafting new trademark, patent and copyright laws
169 Bennett, Chinese Premier, Reagan Agree in Public But Air Differences on Taiwan Privately,
Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1984, at 32, col. 2.
170 Wren, supra note 165.
171 See id.
172 Kg., Old Maoist notions of self-reliance in modernization. See supra notes 145-46 and accom-
panying text.
173 Bennett, Visit to U.S. by China's Premier Zhao Indicates Change in Attitude on Reagan, Wall
St. I., Jan. 9, 1984, at 22, col. 1.
174 The Chinese may object to the export of American culture-the development of consumer
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for the protection of its Western investors and exporters. 178 Both coun-
tries currently seem determined to "create favorable conditions for
strengthening industrial and technological cooperation between the two
countries, in order to strive for a balance in their economic
interests . . 179
V. CONCLUSION
In 1983, United States trade with China fell to a depressed level of
$4.4 billion due to China's calculated decreased demand for United
States imports resulting from the textile dispute between the two coun-
tries.180 With many bilateral issues already resolved, such as export reg-
ulation, and the remaining irritants reduced to manageable proportions,
the two-way trade is, however, expected to reach between $5.5 billion
and $6 billion in 1984.181 Within this figure, United States high technol-
ogy sales to China are estimated to increase to as much as $2 billion from
last year's $800 million as a result of the liberalized trade restrictions.
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While the trade prospects with China look good for United States export-
ers, successful ventures will depend on the successful implementation of
the licensing regulations, Allied cooperation through COCOM in review-
ing license applications expeditiously, sensitivity by United States ven-
dors to China's internal development needs and commercial practices,
and, of course, the acknowledgement by businesspeople of the inextrica-
ble link between the economic and political relations between the
countries.
The new export regulations for the transfer of technology to China
mark a giant step by the United States in establishing significant and
rewarding trading relationships between the two countries. The potential
for United States sellers in the high technology field to realize substantial
profit from foreign investment in China is staggering. The potential in-
vestor should, however, consider the variables that make up a vast new
Chinese market, and recognize that the new market will suffer growing
pains in the early stages of its development. Good trade relations will
therefore require mutual flexibility.
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